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PART 1: BASIC -QUESTIONS
THE FEDERAL INTEREST IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: HEREIN
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE POWER TO
WITHHOLD APPROPRIATED FUNDS
CLARENCE CLYDE FERGUSON, JR.*
The proper allocation of governmental power between the states and the
central government has, since the birth of the Republic, been the subject of
continuing commentary. The topic to which these remarks are addressed
continues in the tradition of that commentary. That this symposium is within
the mainstream of that tradition is made clear by the very subject matter of
this conference. One of the more striking characteristics of non-academic dis-
cussions of American federalism problems is the frequency with which race
provides both the context and the subject matter of analysis. One need only
recall the historical dialogue regarding slavery and the nature of the federal
union transpiring from the Constitutional Convention to the Civil War-and
its final doctrinal benediction delivered in Texas v. W4ite.1 Even now, public
discussion of federalism tends to bi provoked by and centered upon consider-
ations which relate predominately to issues of civil rights. Thus, in the grand
tradition of American federalism analysis, we are gathered together again to
explore the appropriate extent and roles of federal state and local regulation
regarding discrimination, based on race, in employment.
Perhaps it might be well to expose at the beginning--expressly-the central
theme of these remarks: that is, there is an overriding federal responsibility for
both policy declaration and policy implementation in employment discrimination
which has been overlooked on the one hand, and, on the other hand, where
power has been perceived it has remained for the most part unexercised.
It might be well also to point out that in this context of our present social
revolution, there are two major dynamic forces at work. Firstly, there is the
continuing drive to eradicate racial discrimination in employment through
utilization of the processes of the legal system. Surprisingly, this now dynamic
force in the United States has only lately come to be a major factor in the
civil rights movement.2 There is another dimension to the struggle against
discrimination in employment which is only slowly coming to be recognized.
It now seems clear to most perceptive observers that what is truly involved
in the civil rights revolution is a fundamental remaking of the entire American
society.3 The removal of race as a relevant factor in the employment relation
* Dean and Professor of Law, Howard University Law School, Washington, D.C.
1. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
2. See 1961 Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Employment; Pasley,
The Nondiscrimination Clause in Government Contracts, 43 Va. L. Rev. 837 (1957).
3. See, e.g., Ferguson, Civil Rights Legislation 1964: A Study of Constitutional
Resources, 24 Fed. B. J. 102 (1964).
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must inevitably drastically alter the structure and dynamics of our economic
order. And, just as inevitably, fundamental reordering of traditional concepts
of federalism will follow. Thus, as has been true in so much of our social
history, the necessity for resolving a crisis in racial adjustment in our society
generates not only the occasion, but the very mechanisms through which our
federal system is reordered.
I. T=E DENsION OF THE EMPLOYMENT PROBLEM
The total effect of discrimination in the employment relation is almost
impossible to calculate. The statistical profile of the problem tells a dire tale
indeed. For the last four years the unemployment rate among adult Negro
males has consistently averaged almost twice that of the white adult male.
4
Median money income for nonwhite families and individuals is slightly over
half that for whites.,5 In some of the major industrial cities more than one-third
of the Negro work force is unemployed.0 Similar disparities can be projected
for almost any statistical criteria.
7
It is clear, of course, that the mere statement of disparity between white
and nonwhite averages and medians is not necessarily the description of the
results of discrimination in the employment relation. Certainly, lack of edu-
cational opportunity is a contributing cause. Over half the Negro, adult males
have less than a grade school education; 8 school dropout rates continue to in-
crease at a time when more and more educational background is demanded.
And, increasingly we are reminded that frustration breeds in a social environ-
ment based on discriminatory patterns of life and attitudes. Frustration in
turn destroys motivation and lowers horizons of aspiration. Yet, few will
assert that provision of economic opportunities without regard to racial con-
siderations has perhaps the highest potential for dramatically alleviating the
most pressing problems of the current crisis. 10
What is being lost to our economic system now is indeed impossible to
assay. Most reliable estimates are that the dollar cost is of the order of $17
to $20 billion in gross national product every year."1 We know, however, that
the cost of discrimination is much higher. While the impact upon the individual
of cyclical and structural unemployment may be no different for members of
one minority group than for others-the environment of the nonwhite in the
4. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Manpower Report of the President and A Report on
Manpower Requirements, Resources, Utilization, and Training 43, 145 (1963).
5. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 331 (83rd
ed. 1962).
6. 1963 Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Employment 83-87.
7. See, e.g., Ferguson, A Brief Commentary on Urban Redevelopment and Civil
Rights, 9 How. L.J. 101 (1963).
8. Notes 4, 5 supra; National Urban League, Survey of Unemployment in Selected
Urban League Cities (1963).
9. Ibid.
10. See Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks (1959).
11. Council of Economic Advisers Report quoted in Critical Issues Paper (No. 4)
4 (Critical Issues Council 1964).
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United States is such that unemployment and underemployment have a special
dimension. Thus, the role of the nonwhite in the economic system in large part
may be attributed to discriminatory factors in areas other than in the employ-
ment relation. We need not document the proposition, however, that at least
one of the major causes of the statistical disparity between the white and non-
white economic profiles is that of racial discrimination in the employment re-
lation itself.
II. THE FREDERAL ROLE IN THE EMPLOYAENT RELATION
The federal government is a major force in the totality of employment
relations in the United States. It is itself by far the largest employer in the
country.12 It creates and supports millions of employment opportunities through
its direct contracting activities and direct grants-in-aid programs.13 The federal
government subsidizes a system of public employment offices and is engaged
extensively in financing an array of job training programs. 14 It supervises and
regulates certain activities of labor unions.' 5 Finally, it has a constitutional
concern with the flow of interstate commerce-which means substantially any
commerce which is more than of a de minimus level.16
Attention has been focused on the role of the Court, both in its role as
constitutional adjudicator and on its function of policy making in the general
area of racial discrimination. Now, attention is focused on Congress and the
legislative role in elimination of discrimination in job opportunities.17 On this
occasion I should like to address the problem of the federal executive-the
Office of the President-in eradicating discrimination in federally connected em-
ployment. It is recognized that there are two dimensions to the problem of
discrimination in such employment. The first is that of removing discriminatory
practices and patterns. The second dimension is that of affirmatively taking
steps to remove the disabilities created by past deprivation of opportunity. In
treating of the proper role of the federal executive our concern is with the
first of these dimensions: removing discrimination from federally connected
job opportunities.
The nature of the federal employment problem can be best grasped by
considering the findings of a survey conducted by the Civil Rights Commission
for its 1961 Report. Federal agencies in the five metropolitan areas were asked
to count the number of Negro employees in each of three categories of federal
employment; to break down their figures to reflect grade levels and job de-
scriptions of Classification Act employees; and to indicate the number of Negroes
who held supervisory jobs. The major findings reported by the Commission
were as follows:
12. 1961 Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Employment. 19.
13. Id. at 55.
14. • Id. at 99.
15. Id. at 127.
16. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 115.
17. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII.
3
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(1) In the five cities as a whole, 23.4 percent of federal employees
were Negroes; 24.4 percent in Washington, D.C.; 28.5 percent
in Chicago; 17.9 percent in Los Angeles; 18.2 percent in St.
Louis; and 15.5 percent in Mobile.
(2) 42.7 percent of all Negro employees in the five cities were in
Classification Act positions; 31.1 percent were in Wage Board
positions; and 26.2 percent were in "Other" positions, primarily
in the Post Office Department.
(3) Of Negro employees in Classification Act positions, 85.4 percent
were in grades 1 through 4; 14.3 percent in grades 5 through 11;
and 0.3 percent in grades 12 through 15.
(4) 5.2 percent of the total Negro employees were in supervisory
positions.
18
This finding speaks for itself. It tends to confirm the allegations that in the
most accessible employment opportunity (i.e. most free from discrimination),
there is a general confinement of Negroes to the lower paying positions and a
general non-presence in supervisory positions.
It should be pointed out that there has been an improvement in this
matter since that Commission report.
What then can be the response of the executive based on administrative
power?
On March 6, 1961, Executive Order 10925,19 continuing the policy of the
Truman and Eisenhower administrations, established the President's Committee
on Equal Employment Opportunity with jurisdiction ". . . to promote and
ensure equal opportunity for all qualified persons, without regard to race, creed,
color, or national origin, employed or seeking employment with the Federal
Government and on government contracts. . . ." Part II of the Order, relating
to government employment, provides, in part:
SECTION 201. The President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity established by this order is directed immediately to
scrutinize and study employment practices of the Government of the
United States, and to consider and recommend additional affirmative
steps which should be taken by executive departments and agencies
to realize more fully the national policy of nondiscrimination within
the executive branch of the Government.
SEcTION 202. All executive departments and agencies are directed
to initiate forthlvith studies of current government employment prac-
tices within their responsibility. The studies shall be in such form as
the Committee may prescribe and shall include statistics on current
employment patterns, a review of current procedures, and the recom-
mendation of positive measures for the elimination of any discrimi-
nation, direct or indirect, which now exists. Reports and recommen-
dations shall be submitted to the Executive Vice Chairman of the
Committee no later than sixty days from the effective date of this
order, and the Committee, after considering such reports and recom-
18. 1961 Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Employment 27.
19. 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
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mendations, shall report to the President on the current situation and
recommend positive measures to accomplish the objectives of this order.
The Office of President as Chief Administrator.
Among the functional roles of the President is that of chief administrator
of the federal establishment. 20 This function of chief administrator derives
directly from article II, section 1 of the Constitution providing that "The
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States .... ." There
is some question, however, of the extent of the executive power in regard to
employees of the so-called independent agencies. In our context the question
is whether the Office of the President may take steps to secure compliance with
the unquestioned federal policy of nondiscrimination as regards employees of
the independent agencies and offices.
Independent agencies have been defined as those "entirely outside any
regular executive department" of the federal government.21 In this, the more
usual sense of "independence," the characterization is in contradistinction to
the agency within the executive branch of the government2 2 Upon the authori-
ties it is clear that characterization of an agency as independent, as distinct
from executive, has proved viable in resolving certain issues in regard to control
by the President. 3 It does appear, however, that analysis of the status of an
agency as "independent" or otherwise in regard to its function, would be very
useful in regard to the power of the President to administer a constitutionally
based policy. (The basis of this conclusion is set forth in the following section:
The Office of the President as Chief Executive.)
Moreover, although the growth of the independent regulatory agency has
created what Mr. Justice Jackson called the "fourth branch of government,"
Congress in establishing such agencies still recognizes three branches only.
It consistently creates agencies and commissions within "the executive branch."'24
To give to the words "in the executive branch" their plain meaning would
lead to the conclusion that the agencies are subject to executive direction in
at least their housekeeping functions (administration) even though they
are independent of direct presidential supervision in formulation and imple-
mentation of regulatory policy. Recent history of the administration of Presi-
dent Kennedy indicates quite clearly that a willingness to remove discriminatory
patterns can be vigorously exercised within the context of employment through-
out the executive branch.
Few legal problems have arisen in regard to appointments to so-called
20. See Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 114-21 (4th rev. ed. 1957).
21. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions 3 (1941).
22. Landis, The Administrative Process 111 (1938).
23. See, e.g., Humphrey's Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (removal of a
Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission by the President without cause before
expiration of statutory term); cf. Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
24. E.g., Public Law 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957).
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exempt positions directly within the administrative establishment. Actually,
considerable political advantage has been taken of nonwhite appointments to
high positions available to the President.
More difficulty has arisen in regard to federal positions covered either
by Civil Service2 5 or Postal Service regulations.26 Two incidents of recent time
summarize the kinds of problems involved.
It has been reported that the Corps of Engineers office in Louisiana, had
required that if on any appointment under Civil Service a Negro was one of
three eligible candidates for the position and, if for any reason the Negro was
not appointed, administrative explanation would be required on the appoint-
ment of the non-Negro. The second involves the promotion of a Negro super-
visor in the Dallas post office, allegedly over the heads of several white eligibles
who ranked higher on the list of eligibles.
The problem is, of course, whether in both or either of these instances
the result of administrative action was to discriminate in reverse.
In my judgment neither of such cases raises the problem of discrimination
in reverse. First, it should be made clear that neither case lies within the main
theme of the present analysis: they do not involve removing discriminatory
bars. They are in fact examples of administrative techniques designed to assure
equal opportunity in situations where prior discriminatory practices would
result in continued deprivation. In the first case the issue is the creation of an
administrative technique to "police" the administrators. It might be suggested
that the reporting device has at least the utility of building into the direct
administrative process an awareness and consciousness of the problem of dis-
crimination. As such, it is responsive to one of the basic and fundamental
problems of administering norms based on nondiscrimination-how to build
into normal work-a-day administration a concern for implementing policy.
In this sense, this technique is the same as the reporting requirement in many
state administrations imposed after a finding of past discriminatory practices.
In our case, it is arguable that past discriminatory practices in the federal
establishment are so notorious that official notice might well be taken of them-
and reporting obligations established immediately. In the second case, a much
different problem is raised. Whites seem to be deprived of a legitimate ex-
pectation. But, that expectation is in fact based upon prior discrimination. And,
to employ equitable doctrine, it is not inequitable to destroy an expectation
based upon wrongful treatment of Negro competitors in the past.
In sum, it might be safe to predict that the employment of vigorous, and
in some cases imaginative administrative techniques, ultimately resting upon
presidential power, will show dramatic changes in direct federal employment.
On the other hand, it is clear that many problems surround the "agency" of
25. The Pendleton Act (Civil Service Act), 22 Stat. 403 (1883) 5 U.S.C. §§ 631-58
(1958).
26. 39 U.S.C. §§ 31-219 (1958).
FEDERAL INTEREST IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
the President's Committee as an effective specialized organ within the exec-
utive branch.
Executive Power as Chief Executive
Second only in importance to federal contracts as a mechanism for creating
job opportunities is the federal grant-in-aid 7 These grants are made to state
and local governmental units and public agencies, to public institutions and
to private nonprofit organizations. 28 It is in regard to these programs of some
155 kinds29 that the greatest inroads have been made in traditional concepts
.of federalism. And, it is as to these programs and their secondarily generated
job opportunities that executive power is at its maximum. Ultimately, the
power to assure equal opportunity in these programs rests upon the executive
power to see to the faithful execution of the Constitution. And, experience here
indicates that the moat effective administrative technique is the threat to with-
hold previously appropriated funds. It is to the constitutional basis of this
power that the following analysis is directed.
The power to appropriate federal funds is vested in Congress.30 Congress
not only has such constitutional power of appropriation but can attach limiting
conditions to the expenditure. But it is clear that Congress cannot attach an
unconstitutional condition to an appropriation.3l In U.S. v. Lovett,32 the Supreme
Court held that a condition attached to an appropriation prohibiting expenditure
of funds to pay salaries of certain individuals was an unconstitutional bill of
attainder. The principle is well settled that exercises of congressional power are
limited by the Constitution.
3
Section 8 of article I of the United States Constitution grants to Congress
the ".. . Power To lay and collect Taxes ... and provide for the ...general
Welfare . . ." The federal government, like state governments, must exercise
its powers to distribute funds, as well as its other powers, ". . . so as not to
discriminate between [its citizens] except upon some reasonable differentiation
fairly related to the object of regulation.1
3 4
It has been squarely held that governmentally required or permitted racial
segregation ".. . is not reasonably related to any proper governmental ob-
jective. . . ."3 To the same extent that the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment has been held to prohibit discrimination based upon
race where a state is involved, the due process clause of the fifth amendment
27. U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Special Analysis of Federal Aid to State and Local
Governments in 1962 Budget 3-4 (1962).
28. 1961 Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Employment 81-93.
29. Ibid.
30. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
31. U.S. v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
32. Id. at 315.
33. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
34. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring opinion.)
35. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
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prohibits discrimination where the federal government is so involved."0 Thus,
the federal government is prohibited from expending its funds in the support
of racial segregation in its own projects, activities and programs under the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.
The adherence by the federal government to the policy of nondiscrimi-
nation in its own activities, while at the same time financing racial discrimi-
nation by supporting state conducted projects and activities where such practices
are maintained is an obvious inconsistency. The issue raised by this inconsistency
is whether the congressional appropriation and subsequent executive expenditure
of federal funds are federal activities exempt from the limitations implicit
within the due process clauise of the fifth amendment merely because the
government is one step removed from the forbidden activity. The applicable
principle of law has been succinctly stated by Justice Frankfurter:
Congress may withhold all sorts of facilities for a better life but if it
affords them it cannot make them available in an obviously arbitrary
way . . .",a
Examination of cases in which this principle has been applied as a limitation
on expenditure of state funds under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment demonstrates that the due process clause of the fifth amendment
necessarily prohibits support by the federal government to racially segregated
state conducted projects, activities and programs.
In a series of cases it has been held that where state funds have been
used to purchase, build, operate, or lease for operation public facilities, the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that those
facilities be available on a nondiscriminatory basis. 8 Clearly for the federal
government to furnish funds to the states to underwrite the cost of similar
activities in a racially segregated manner would result in that Government's
sanctioning discriminatory practices which, under the Bolling formulation, the
federal government could not itself conduct without contravening the prohi-
bitions of the fifth amendment's due process clause. That the federal government
cannot escape its constitutional limitations by furnishing the ways and means
for a private individual, corporation or state to discriminate against its own
citizens is clearly indicated by the Supreme Court's denouncement of such
practice by a state under the fourteenth amendment. In Burton, the state
leased a public restaurant facility to a corporation which excluded Negroes
solely because of their race. In holding that the restaurant was subject to the
36. Id. at 499.
37. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 417 (1950) (separate
opinion.)
38. For cases relating to state owned facilities, see, e.g., Muir v. Louisville Park
Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (per curiam) (city park facilities); Gayle v.
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (buses operated on city streets.) For cases
relating to facilities leased from the state, see, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (restaurant); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350
(1962) (restaurant in airport.)
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strictures of the fourteenth amendment, the Court noted that in its lease the
state could have expressly forbidden racial discrimination, and then went on
to say:
But no State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either
ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the
motive may be. It is of no consolation to an individual denied the
equal protection of the laws that it was done in good faith .... By its
inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only made
itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power,
property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination.39
Surely the due process clause of the fifth amendment does not require less
where the federal government plays a vital role in the support of racial segre-
gation. Thus, the proscriptions of the fifth amendment are as binding on the
federal government itself as on the grantees of federal funds.
The scope of due process limitation upon the power of the federal govern-
ment is clearly laid down in Cooper v. Aaron.
State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, manage-
ment, funds, or property cannot be squared with the Amendment's
command that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. The right of a student not to be segre-
gated on racial grounds in schools so maintained is indeed so funda-
mental and pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process
of law. Boiling v. Skarpe, 347 U.S. 497.
4
0
The President's duty to faithfully execute the laws is not limited solely to
acts of Congress or treaties made pursuant to the Constitution, but includes
"the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, . . .
and all the protection implied by the nature of the Government under the
Constitution." 41 In the words of Professor Corwin, " 'that the President is
entitled to claim broad powers under his duty to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed' has been demonstrated many times in our history."42
The expenditure of federal funds (as distinct from the appropriation) is
an executive function. In the words of Corwin, The Constitution
*.. assumes that expenditure is primarily an executive function, and
conversely that the participation of the legislative branch is essentially
for the purpose simply of setting bounds to executive discretion-a
theory confirmed by early practice under the Constitution 3
The exercise of executive powers is no less subject to the limitations of the
Constitution than the exercise of legislative or judicial powers.
44
39. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, id. at 725.
40. 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958).
41. Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890).
42. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers--(4th rev. ed. 1957).
43. Id. at 127-28.
44. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Executive Power Where Congress is Silent.
The power of the President, pursuant to his constitutional duty, to direct
appropriate rule making exercises by executive and independent agencies has
been exercised on many occasions. On the most recent occasions, the power
was exercised expressly to require the eradication of discriminatory practices
in areas of responsibility posited with particular agencies under statutes devoid
of antidiscrimination provisions. It has been concluded on this basis that:
The lack of serious challenge to the exercise of this authority by four
Presidents in nine executive orders over twenty years lends support
to presidential power to prescribe nondiscrimination, at least until
Congress acts.45
It should be noted that there is no express statutory authorization for
this exercise of Presidential power. The absence of such authorization amply
serves again to illustrate that the duty of the President under the Constitution
is broader than simply the fulfilling of the will of Congress as reflected in
congressional enactments. As the Supreme Court held in Cunningham v.
Neagle,46 the duty of the President is not limited solely to acts of Congress or
treaties made pursuant to the Constitution, but includes "the rights, duties and
obligations growing out of the Constitution itself . ..and all the protection
implied by the nature of the Government under the Constitution."
Executive Power Where Congress Requires Federal Support of Discrimination.
A definite issue of course would be raised where there is an express con-
gressional direction to the President to administer a statute in an unconstitu-
tional manner. In that event, absent a binding determination by the Supreme
Court, the President is obligated to refuse execution of laws of Congress which
in his judgment are in violation of the Constitution if such congressional acts
are administered in accordance with congressional direction.
The question at this point is whether the President, relying expressly
upon his duty to "take care that the Laws be faithfully executed" (United
States Constitution article II, section 3) can refuse to administer an act of
Congress on the ground that he believes the administration of the Act would
result in racial discrimination supported by federal funds, and, consequently,
that it violates the fifth amendment of the Constitution, and thus the act as so
applied and administered was not "made in Pursuance thereof.147 It appears
to be wholly erroneous to assert that:
[I]t is not the responsibility of the Executive to pass upon the con-
stitutionality of statutes enacted by Congress, once they have been
finally approved by the President.
45. Speck, Enforcement of Nondiscrimination Requirements for Government Contract
Work, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 243, 245-46 (1963).
46. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
47. U.S. Const. art. VI,
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Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution4 8 has provided
us with what is perhaps the best articulated assertion of a broad power in
the President to refuse to carry out a legislative mandate which he believes
to violate the Constitution. In laying the groundwork for a discussion of why
the Supreme Court is the final arbiter with respect to constitutional questions,
Dean Story made the following observations:
The Constitution, contemplating the grant of limited powers, and
distributing them among various functionaries, . . . whenever any
question arises as to the exercise of any power by any of these func-
tionaries under the State or Federal Government, it is of necessity that
such functionaries must, in the first instance, decide upon the consti-
tutionality of the exercise of such powers .... The officers of each of
these departments [executive, legislative and judicial] are equally
bound by their oaths of office to support the Constitution of the United
States, and are therefore conscientiously bound to abstain from all acts
which are inconsistent with it. . . .If, for instance, the President is
required to do any act, he is not only authorized but required to decide
for himself, whether, consistently with his constitutional duties, he
can do the act.
49
In contrast to some arguments in support of the same conclusion, ° Story
makes it clear that in his eye the President's duty to decide constitutional
questions is limited to cases "not hitherto settled by any proper authority,"
and that a decision by the Supreme Court with respect to the matter in issue
would be binding on the President.51 Counsel for President Johnson in his
impeachment proceedings made'an argument similar to that of Story in de-
fending President Johnson's refusal to comply with the Tenure of Office Act
of 1867 on the ground that it was unconstitutional, but added the additional
limitation that the situation be such that only by a refusal to act could the
President raise a justiciable issue.
52
Stated in this form, the argument is not that the position of the President
is superior to that of Congress, but only that each of the two branches of the
Government owes a duty to obey the Constitution and that the opportunities
to act in the light of his duty will occur at different times because of the separate
role each has in dealing with matters of national concern. Thus Congress may
refuse to enact a law recommended by the President, because of a belief that
the law would be unconstitutional, and thus to a certain extent appear re-
sponsible for frustrating the aims of the President. The President, on the other
hand, when it comes time to execute a law of Congress may refuse to do so
48. 1 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (4th ed. 1873).
49. Id. at 264-65.
S0. R,g., Meigs, The Independence of the Departments of Government, 23 Am. L. Rev.
594 (1889).
51. See 1 Commentaries 265.
52. Curtis, Argument on Behalf of President Johnson in Impeachment Pr ceedings,
Cong. Globe (Supp.), 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 126-127 (1868), quoted in 1 Freund, Sutherland,
Howe & Brown, Constitutional Law 18-19 (2d ed. 1961). See also Story, 1 Commentaries
op. cit. supra note 48, at 266-67.
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because of his belief that the law is unconstitutional. It should be noted that
the duty to ascertain constitutionality is an executive duty required by the
Constitution itself. Subordinate executive and administrative officials are not
directed to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" as is the President.
On occasion, however, the courts have recognized that such subordinated ad-
ministrators may determine the constitutionality of an enactment they are
required to administer.53 In Little Rock & Fort Smith Ry. v. Worthen," the
Court set forth the reasons why subordinate executive and administrative
officials ordinarily are not permitted to determine the constitutionality of statutes
they are administering. In a decision which vindicated the action of a state
board of railroad commissioners in disregarding, on constitutional grounds, a
legislative exemption of certain railroad property from taxation, the Court
commented:
It may not be a wise thing, as a rule, for subordinate executive or
ministerial officers to undertake to pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation prescribing their duties, and to disregard it if in their judg-
ment it is invalid. This may be a hazardous proceeding to themselves,
and productive of great inconvenience to the public but still the deter-
mination of the judicial tribunals can alone settle the legality of their
action. 55
Both the President and Congress of course must obey the decisions of the
Supreme Court. But, absent such a decision, the President must firstly address
himself to the constitutionality of his administration of congressionally approved
programs.5 6
Executive Power Where Congress Prohibits Federal Support of Discrimination.
On the other hand, if Congress enacts a nondiscriminatory provision, no
problems whatsoever as to the extent of executive power would be raised. Here,
in the words of Mr. Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube,"7 the exec-
utive power is at its maximum.
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authori-
zation of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes
all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can
delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said
(for what it may be worth), to personify the federal sovereignty. If
his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually
means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks
power
5
The President's Executive Order regarding equal opportunity in housing
stands as ample precedent for the exercise of executive power to assure admin-
53. E.g., Little Rock & Fort Smith Ry. v. Worthen, 120 U.S. 97 (1887).
54. Ibid.
55. Id. at 101.
56. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
57. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
58. Id. at 635.
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istration of federal programs in a constitutional manner.59 The order itself
clearly reveals its constitutional basis:
[T]he executive branch of the Government, in faithfully executing
the laws of the United States which authorize Federal financial assist-
ance, directly or indirectly, for the provision, rehabilitation, and oper-
ation of housing and related facilities, is charged with an obligation
and duty to assure that those laws are fairly administered and that
benefits thereunder are made available to all Americans without regard
to their race, color, creed, or national origin. (Emphasis added.)
Among the sanctions which may be imposed for violation of the policy of
nondiscrimination is withholding of federal assistance. Section 302 of the Order
expressly provides that appropriate departments and agencies may:
(a) cancel or terminate in whole or in part any agreement or contract
with such person, firm, or State or local public agency providing
for a loan, grant, contribution, or other Federal aid, or for the
payment of a commission or fee;
(b) refrain from extending any further aid under any program ad-
ministered by it and affected by this order until it is satisfied that
the affected person, firm or State or local public agency will
comply with the rules, regulations, and procedures issued or
adopted pursuant to this order, and any nondiscrimination pro-
visions included in any agreement or contract;
(c) refuse to approve a lending institution or any other lender as a
beneficiary under any program administered by it which is affected
by this order or revoke such approval if previously given.
There is little doubt as to the constitutional authority of the President to
issue an order with such provisions.
There would appear to be little doubt that the issuance of the Executive
Order in housing is constitutional. It can be concluded that the President has
authority to act, based: (1) in part upon the provisions of 42 U. S. C., section
1982 ("all citizens of the United States shall have the same right in every
state .. .as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold and convey real ...property"); (2) in part on the constitutional
requirements for equal protection of the'laws and due process (particularly as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Hurd v. Hodge,60 ruling that a federal
court may not lend its aid to enforcement of a private racially restrictive
covenant); (3) in part on the precedent of the Executive Orders requiring a
nondiscrimination clause in government contracts; and (4) in part on the
rulemaking powers conferred on the housing agencies by their basic statutes.
Moreover, the issuance of Executive Orders imposing and renewing pro-
hibitions against discrimination on the basis of race in employment and contract
work for the federal government reaffirms the underlying constitutional power
of the President to direct the manner of expenditure of federal funds or
59. Executive Order 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962).
60. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
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ultimately to require the withholding of federal expenditures in specified cir-
cumstances. The last reaffirmation of this executive power was in President
Kennedy's Executive Order 10925.61 The constitutional foundation for the
issuance of the Order has been commented upon extensively in legal literature.0 2
The President in addition to his overriding executive authority pursuant
to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed has
by statute the power to direct the manner in which Government business is
conducted. 63 Section 22 of title 5 of the United States Code provides that each
executive department head
is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law,
for the government of his department, the conduct of its officers and
clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody,
use, and preservation of the records, papers and property appertaining
to it.
In addition, the present federal budget system makes provision for the
withholding of expenditure of appropriated funds. The position of the Bureau
of the Budget is:
In requiring that money be placed in reserve, the Bureau proceeds
also on the principle that ordinarily an appropriation is merely an
authorization and not a mandate to spend money for the specified
purpose. 64
On matters of defense expenditures, there is a considerable body of executive
precedent in withholding appropriated funds.6 5
In considering the power of the executive to assure nondiscrimination in
federal assistance, it is important to recognize that a number of significant
steps already have been taken toward that objective by heads of executive
departments.
For example, former Secretary Ribicoff ruled that beginning in September
1963, racially segregated public education would not be considered "suitable"
under the terms of the Impacted Area school program for children residing
on federal properties. Several important steps were taken to implement this
ruling. First, the Departments of Health, Education and Welfare, and Justice
undertook a series of negotiations with school districts in an effort to secure
compliance. As a result, fifteen districts said that they would admit on-base
children on a nonracial basis, and most have gone beyond this by indicating
that they would adopt policies of desegregation which would benefit all students
within the district. In five areas where compliance was not forthcoming, the
61. 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
62. See Speck, note 45 supra; Birnbaum, Equal Employment Opportunity in
Executive Order 10925; 11 Kan. L. Rev. 17 (1962); Bennett, Non-Discrimination Provisions
of Federal Contracts, Mich. S.B.J. 21 (March 1952); and Pasley, The Nondiscrimination
Clause in Government Contracts, 43 Va. L. Rev. 837 (1957).
63. Rev. Stat. § 161 (1875), 5 U.S.C. 22 (1958).
64. See Wallace, Congressional Control of Federal Spending 145 (1960).
65. Id. at 146.
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Department of Justice determined that it had authority and standing to initiate
lawsuits (without express statutory authorization) on behalf of Negro military
dependents seeking desegregation of federally-aided local schools. In eight other
localities where commitments could not be obtained, the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare decided to build schools on base in order to provide
suitable education for children living on federal property.
These actions, of course, have not come close to solving completely the
problem of providing equal educational opportunity for the children of military
personnel. They are directed primarily toward families who live on federal
property, with only peripheral benefit thus far to the great bulk of military
dependents who reside off base. Nonetheless, the actions add up to an affirma-
tive assertion of executive authority to assure nondiscrimination.
Even absent an express statutory nondiscriminatory provision of mandatory
nature, the executive obligation compels executive action to assure nondiscrimi-
nation in administration of federal programs. Moreover, either the rejection or
the enactment of a "nondiscrimination" provision by Congress cannot, under
the Constitution, derogate from the constitutional scope of executive power.
Therefore, while one would support the objective of legislative nondiscriminatory
provisions, it is clear that such provisions are not necessary to establish exec-
utive power to reach the same end. But, at the most, such provisions would
represent expressions of congressional intent that federal programs be admin-
istered in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
